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Abstract—Dedicated infrastructure for wireless battery-
powered smart meters involves a costly setup. To reduce the
cost, one often made compromise is the link reliability, where
a majority of packets are allowed to be in error, as long as a
few packets are received over a long time frame. On the other
hand, each meter transmits frequently to accommodate for drive-
by/walk-by remote reading applications, leaving redundancy in
the transmissions seen on a dedicated receiver. We utilize the
redundancy and the inherent timing structure of the protocol in
order to recover metering data from multiple erroneous packet
receptions. From an actual deployment a receiver sensitivity gain
is found to be around 1dB, equivalent to increasing the number
of read meters by 14% in an experiment over 66 hours.
Index Terms—WM-Bus, Packet Recovery, Protocol Coding
I. INTRODUCTION
Operation lifetime is the key parameter for battery-powered
wireless smart meters for heat, cooling and water. This im-
pacts many elements in the design of a meter, in particular
the transmission protocol, which for this type of device is
mainly dominated by Wireless M-Bus [1] in Europe. As a
receiving module is power-hungry, most meters in this class
are transmitter-only devices. The rate of meter transmissions
varies with the manufacturer, the product, and the actual meter
use case. One typical operational mode has frequent (e.g.
four packets per minute), short transmissions which enable
drive-by/walk-by remote reading. An alternative system oper-
ation features a large-scale infrastructure deployment, where
deployed receivers aim to read the surrounding meters and
achieve certain reliability. The system can tolerate a significant
amount of packet errors, and reliability can be satisfied if at
least some data is received over a time frame of minutes, or
even a much longer period, e.g. day or month. Wireless M-Bus
meters are allowed to retransmit the same encrypted data in
up to 300 seconds. This mitigates the energy-consuming en-
cryption step, and as a consequence, it introduces a significant
amount of repetitions of the same encrypted data.
In this paper we show the gain that can be obtained
by recovering data from multiple erroneous packets on a
stationary receiver, demonstrated experimentally in an actual
deployment. The main instruments for the recovery process
are: 1) the data redundancy in the transmissions, together with
2) the inherent strict transmission scheduling on the meters,
which acts as side information when we associate multiple
erroneous arrivals with a specific meter. A common way to
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Fig. 1: Packets with predictable transmission intervals and
their mapping to independent observations for packet recovery.
combine erroneous packets is in the baseband domain, using
noisy samples from multiple receivers or multiple antennas.
However, in our setting each erroneous packet contains only
hard bit decisions, and we combine packets across multiple
arrivals over time. The idea is illustrated in Fig. 1, where
to correctly identify packets from the same meter, we utilize
the strict packet transmission interval function. This function
allows to relate a packet arrival to past and future arrivals,
and from this derive information about the underlying meter
who transmitted the data. In addition to know if a packet is
transmitted from a particular meter, we identify which adjacent
packets belongs to the same data set. When identified, a data
recovery procedure can use these multiple observations and
ultimately recover the data.
Field-test experiments indicate a possible recovery gain, as
seen in Fig. 2, where the received signal strength is related to
the number of erroneously detected packets. The figure is from
one particular deployment, but others show a similar trend of a
large number of erroneously received packets that are acquired
at the edge of the receiver sensitivity.
II. BACKGROUND AND SYSTEM MODEL
Consider packets from a Wireless M-Bus conforming meter.
The specification allows for a variety of modes of operation,
with a large freedom for customization from the individual
vendor. The model presented here is typical, and is the
operation of Wireless M-Bus meters from e.g. Kamstrup [2].
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Fig. 2: Histogram of packet arrivals for various signal strengths
with a configured sync word qualifier of 30/32 bits. The data
is from the dataset considered throughout the paper.
Let the packet i belong to a session of eight packets. The
eight packets within a session all contain the same sampled
data set. There are two types of packet layout within a session:
Full Packet is the first packet in a session, and contains all
information to interpret the packet payload so that for each
data record, static record header information such as the type
of data, unit of data, etc. is included. Compact Packet is the
packet layout for the following seven transmissions, which
include only the data records, while the header information
must be derived from a previously sent full packet to interpret
the data records. The seven compact packet transmissions
are almost repetitions of the same packet, except the update
of Access Number (ACC) and the link-layer CRC for each
transmission. The ACC is a one byte transmission counter
incremented for each transmission, and we denote the ACC
for the ith packet from a meter xi, and its received version yi
which may be in error if the packet is detected to be in error.
Let the indicator function r(i, j) identify if the two packets
i and (i + j) belongs to the same repetition, so that r(i, j)
evaluates to 1 if packet i and (i+ j) are both compact frames
from the same session, and 0 otherwise.
A packet i transmitted at time ti, uniquely identifies the
transmission timeslot for any past and future transmission (i+
j) from the same meter. The slot for the jth transmission
relative to the ith packet is defined as:[
axi(j), bxi(j)
)
=
[
tnomxi (j)−θxi(j), t
nom
xi (j)−θxi(j)+τxi(j)
)
,
where tnomxi (j) is the nominal interval, θxi(j) is the time the
transmission is allowed to arrive earlier, and τxi(j) is duration
of the timeslot where the (i + j)th packet can arrive. The
limits on θxi(j) and τxi(j) are defined by the specification
and depends on the operating conditions for a given meter.
It is important to note that the slot for packet (i+j) depends
on the ACC xi in the ith packet. With this relation, the timing
side information element can now be exemplified as follows:
If the receiver observes two erroneous packets, then by their
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Fig. 3: Synchronous packet arrival times, pairing of packets,
and constructed traces.
presence at specific arrival times, this time difference inher-
ently contains information about the transmitted ACCs in the
two packets. But in contrast to the error prone packet payload,
the arrival time is a very reliable measure [3]. It is important
to note that the, on the receiver, expected arrival time of
packet (i+ j) depends on the received, and possibly erroneous
ACC yi. This introduces an uncertainty in the establishment
of the timing relation between erroneously received packets,
an uncertainty which is not present in other setups where a
recovery operation achieves multiple observations by means
of multiple receivers or multiple antennas.
III. PACKET GROUPING
Before any packet recovery can be applied, one needs to
identify which packets belongs to which session from which
meter. The packets to be recovered are inherently erroneous,
so any information within the packets cannot be fully trusted,
ultimately affecting the way the receiver can distinguish pack-
ets. We will group packets by sessions heuristically:
1) Find all pairs of two packets from the same meter.
2) From the pairs build a packet trace which is a complete
identified sequence of packets from the same meter.
3) From the traces, identify packets belonging to the same
session, which is to be recovered.
The three steps in packet grouping are exemplified in Fig. 3.
The transmitted packets from a meter follows a specific timing
interval. The interval is predicted by the receiver, and the
erroneous packets are paired (indicated by arrows) through
their arrival time such that the timing has an error correcting
feature. Next, a trace is constructed by linking pairs together
into a sequence of pairs. Finally, from the constructed trace,
the individual sessions (indicated by color) are identified.
A. Pairing of Packets
It has been shown in [3] how to build pairs of two
packets originating from the same meter based on the packet
arrival time. The approach is similar to reconstructing location
pointers to (forward and backward) messages in slot selection
algorithms, as seen in e.g. RFID [4].
To create pointers based on the unreliable yi, a series of
virtual slots are created in which the next arrival from the
same meter may arrive, one for each likely (for the receiver
unknown) actual transmitted xi. Each virtual slot ξ have a
penalty associated, given by the Hamming distance H(yi, ξ−
j), where ξ is the value of the virtual slot in which the (i +
j)th packet can arrive. For example, if j = 1 (two adjacent
packets from same meter) and ξ = yi+1 which is the expected
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Fig. 4: Experiment values for calibration and grouping.
increment of the ACC, then no bit error occurred in yi if
paired with an arrival in slot ξ as H(yi, ξ − 1) = 0. If yi =
0 is the observed ACC, then for the virtual slot ξ′ = 2, a
single bit error must have occurred in the received ACC yi,
as H(yi, ξ′ − 1) = 1, etc.
Upon the arrival of a packet in a virtual slot, a decision is
made on whether the packet i who initiated the setup of the
slot, and the just arrived packet α should be paired (is α really
the (i+j)th packet from the same meter?). A pairing decision
is made, if the total Hamming distance satisfies:
H(ξ − j, yi) +H(ξ, yα) +H(IDi, IDα) ≤M,
where M is a threshold value, and IDx is a static field in the
header of packet x including e.g. meter identification. H(ξ −
j, yi) is the penalty of using the virtual slot ξ setup by packet
i, and H(ξ, yα) is the penalty for packet α of picking the
virtual slot ξ.
A premise for proper packet pairing is that the arrival time
is sampled with sufficient precision. This is illustrated in Fig. 3
where to distinguish e.g. the orange from the red arrival,
the receiver must be able to precisely predict the expected
arrival time. The exact required precision depends on the
number of meters within range of the receiver, but also on
how well the transmission timing on the meters behave. We
propose a simple adaptive timer calibration in order to align
any timing offset incurred by the meters. The method does not
depend on any factory pre-calibration or online temperature
compensation. Instead, it uses the arrival time of the packets
as reference. This puts a relaxing set of requirements on the
receiver, while it also precisely captures any fluctuations in
the setup due to varying operation conditions. The time for
the virtual slot ξ is defined from a local imprecise clock as:[
aξ−j(j), bξ−j(j)
)
=
[
alξ−j(j)νa, b
l
ξ−j(j)νb
)
,
where alξ−j(j) and b
l
ξ−j(j) are the slot boundaries according
to the local receiver clock, which are compensated with νa =
µ− σ and νb = µ+ σ, where µ and σ are calibration values.
From the considered experiment, the arrival time at the
receiver relative to the expected arrival time according to the
local (uncalibrated) timer clock is in Fig. 4a, suggesting that
a compensation on the receiver should be made for around
µ = −42 ppm. The standard deviation of σ ≈ 5 ppm provides
a tight bound on the expected arrival time of a future packet,
and is well within the Wireless M-Bus specification.
B. Session Grouping
The last step before actual data recovery is to identify
sessions with the same packet data within each trace. A session
number s is included in each packet to denote the session the
packet belongs to, but this field is unreliable due to possible
packet errors. As an alternative we will use the encrypted
payload itself as an indicator to relate two packets to the same
session. In general, it can be assumed that any two cleartext
payloads reveal encrypted equivalents with a large variation
when the encryption initialization vector is changed1. That is:
H(i, j)  H(i, j′),
where H(i, j) is the Hamming distance between packet i and
j, when r(i, j) = 1 and r(i, j′) = 0. This is illustrated in
Fig. 4b showing the distance between adjacent packets at
a given position within the packet. The positions does not
include the full packet, but only the four bytes of the session
number and the encrypted payload. In the beginning where
the session number is located, the distance is expectedly low,
as only a few bits are updated when the session number
changes. At the positions where the encrypted payload is
located, the distance diverges rapidly with an average distance
of 4 bits/byte, and it is easy to identify packets from the same
session. From the example in Fig. 3, if two same-color packets
are compared, this will belong to the green set of lines, while
if packets from two different sessions are compared, the result
belongs to the red set of lines.
IV. RECOVERY PROCEDURE
The recovery step is the data processing part working with
the hard converted bits from the erroneously received packets
grouped by session. The procedure is a mix of bitwise majority
voting, and use of the error correcting capabilities of a CRC.
This type of correcting measure is well studied. The majority
voting mechanism has been used in [5] which also includes a
simple example, and the error correcting capabilities of CRC
is detailed in [6] with several hardware optimizations, e.g. [7].
Data integrity wise, we are not restricted to only test a
limited set of bit combinations during recovery. If only CRC is
used to verify the recovered packet, the search space is mainly
limited by the used CRC polynomial. The minimum bit error
generating polynomial for the generator polynomial used in
Wireless M-Bus is zi(z151+1), hence the minimum Hamming
distance is 2 for messages over 151 bits. This suggest that
a different verification strategy should be used together with
plain link layer CRC. It can be shown that by transforming
the reconstructed compact packet into its full packet equivalent
(by inserting the static data record headers) which is already
done at the receiver to interpret the data in the compact packet,
this operation guarantees a final minimum Hamming distance
of 42. This distance is considered to be sufficient, and is
1The session number is part of the 128 bit AES-CTR initialization vector.
2Except for a limited set of compact packet lengths.
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Fig. 5: Field test results.
equivalent to what the receiver sees without recovery. Further
data integrity should be validated on higher layers with other
message authentication such as CMAC.
V. FIELD TEST RESULTS
We will through an experiment on a dedicated receiver, val-
idate the data-bit-recovery performance working on multiple
erroneous packets. The receiver is located in a city with a
scattered meter deployment, and does only cover a fraction of
the full setup. The experiment is run over 66 hours and packets
are observed from 84 different meters (without recovery).
When comparing present operation with recovery operation,
the quality is measured as follows: If any compact packet
successfully arrives without recovery at the receiver, we count
one full session as known. If no successful compact packet
arrives for a session, the recovery operation is conducted, and
if successfully validated, it counts as one recovered session.
Fig. 5a shows the number of received/recovered sessions for
a given average RSSI, considered cumulatively across all the
meters, possibly with more than one counted session per meter.
The figure shows a clear improvement just below the original
receiver sensitivity, in the region that features the majority of
erroneously received packets from Fig. 2. Fig. 5b shows the
improvement due to recovery: at −109 dBm the receiver finds
nine times more sessions when applying recovery.
Because of the relaxed reliability requirements, we hope
for a few sessions from many meters. To see if this applies,
consider Fig. 5c, where the number of unique sessions per
meter is shown, where a meter is identified from the average
RSSI over the experiment. A blue point is the number of
received sessions from a single meter during the experiment
without recovery. When a blue point is in a pair with a red
point, the difference between the two points indicates the
improvement due to recovery. If a red point is isolated, then it
corresponds to a meter being (fully) recovered with the given
number of sessions in a way where no single successful packet
was received through the experiment. The horizontal lines
are average lines: if. e.g. a point is located on the hour/avg
line, the number of sessions received is on average one per
hour, averaged over the experiment time. The experimental
results from Fig. 5c suggest a gain of around 1 dB, but for the
given deployment where a large number devices are located at
the edge of receiver sensitivity, this 1 dB means a significant
increase of 12 meters which are now also seen by the receiver.
To further increase the gain it is relevant to consider
the limiting element of the operation. One element is the
requirement that at least two packets must be detected within
the sequence of seven repeated compact frames before the
recovery operation starts. To make this event more likely, we
believe that the main limitation is the sync word qualifier in the
receiver. In the experiment it is 30/32 bits, hence a sync word
is detected if 30 out of 32 bits are as expected. Lowering this
requirement will clearly increase the number of false positive
sync words, but will also relax the criteria for receiving an
erroneous packet. Because of hardware limitations, it has not
been possible to loosen the sync word qualifier.
VI. CONCLUSION
We show how the packet arrival time can be used as a side
information for error correction at the receiver. Using this as
basis, packets with equivalent payload can be grouped, and
used as input for a simple recovery procedure. The results from
an actual deployment show a significant increase of received
data in the region around the receiver sensitivity, and when the
data are grouped by the transmitting meter, an increase in the
number of discovered meters suggests a receiver sensitivity
gain of around 1dB compared to operation without recovery.
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